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COMMENT.
LIABILITY OF DISSOLVED CORPORATIONS.
At common law upon the dissolution of a corporation its real
property reverts to the donors and its personal property escheats to
the sovereign, while all debts owing to or by it are extinguished.
This rule of law had its origin at a time when the only corporations
were ecclesiastical and municipal. Morawetz Priv. Corp., Sec. 1o32.
It was founded on sound principles, for these corporations had no
stockholders and few, if any, creditors and were created and em-
powered to hold property to accomplish certain ends. When they
ceased to be able to exercise the functions for which they were
created, it was proper that the property held by them should revert to
the source from whence it came.
The great mass of corporations to-day, however, are business
corporations, differing essentially from the ecclesiastical and munic-
ipal corporations of old England. They are organized for the
benefit of their stockholders. The property which they possess is
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accumulated from the funds paid in by the stockholders, the corpo-
ration itself holding the property merely as trustee. Therefore,
when the corporation is dissolved and the purposes of the trust fail,
it would seem that the property should revert to the stockholders,
as the original donors.
The business corporation, however, must from its nature, have
many creditors and, since the corporation, considered apart from its
stockholders, is a mere fiction, the liabilities of the corporation are
in reality the liabilities of the stockholders. Morawetz Priv. Corp.,
Sec. 1034. Hence, if the stockholders are to derive the benefits,
upon a dissolution they should be forced to recognize the rights of
the creditors.
Obviously, therefore, the rule of the common law is arbitrary
and unjust when applied to the business corporation.
The harshness of this rule was early observed by the Chancery
Courts, which were quick to afford relief by treating the assets of the
dissolved corporation as a trust fund belonging to the stockholders,
subject to the rights of creditors. Curran v. State of Arkansas, 15
How. 304. In this, as well as in many other reforms, the legislatures
have followed the Chancery Courts and made statutory provisions
for the protection of both stockholders and creditors upon dissolution
of corporations. Morawetz Priv. Corp., Sec. 1037.
But, while the law governing the rights of creditors whose claims
are based upon contractual relations with the corporation has been
firmly established, there still exists very great uncertainty, due from
the lack of adjudicated cases, as to the rights of parties whose causes
of action arise from the torts of the dissolved corporation.
An important decision on this point has recently been rendered
by the New York Court of Appeals in case of Shayne v. Evening
Post Publishing Co., 61 N. E. 115.
The facts, in brief, are these: The plaintiff brought an action
to recover damages for alleged libels published in the defendant's
newspaper. Before the trial the defendant corporation was dissolved
and the action abated. The plaintiff moved the court for an order
reviving the action against the directors of the defunct corpor-
ation and the motion was granted. The Supreme Court in its
appellate division, however, reached the conclusion that the death of
the corporation operated to destroy the cause of action and reversed
the order. The Court of Appeals overruled the Appellate Division
and sustained the order issued by the trial justice to receive the
action.
COMMENT.
The opinion is based on three grounds: The Court first points
out that, since there are no decisions bearing directly upon the ques-
tion it is free to discuss the case upon its merits and proceeds to do
so. The dangers of a contrary doctrine are clearly set forth, not
the least of which is the opportunity that would be afforded to stock-
holders to avoid all liability by dissolving the corporation and im-
mediately reorganizing. It is also lucidly shown that the doctrine
of the Court is not burdensome to the stockholders, inasmuch as no
property is thereby subjected to the satisfaction of the plaintiff's
claim that was not so subject before dissolution.
The second ground involves the interpretation of the statutory
laws of New York and is therefore not of general interest.
But the third ground, namely, that the rule "Actio personalis
moritur cum persona" should not be applied to corporations, raises
a very interesting question.
The defendant contended that this common law maxim had been
recognized by the courts of this country and was in force except
when annulled by legislative enactment; that the statutes authorizing
the continuance of certain actions against the administrators and
executors of deceased wrong doers expressly excludes actions for
libel; that, hence, by a process of analogical reasoning the common
law rule might be extended to include artificial "persons," and thus ex-
tinguish actions for libel against dissolved corporations. This theory
of the defendant was adopted by the Appellate Division. (56 App.
Div. 426).
The Court of Appeals, however, shows the fallacy of the analogy
by pointing out the reason for the rule preventing suits against an
executor for the wrongs of their testators, i. e., that as the executors
have committed no wrong they should not be prosecuted for torts in
actions which were originally designed for the punishment of the
wrong doer. The Court further shows that on the other hand the
remedy for torts committed by corporations is against the property
of the corporation solely and that whether the judgment be obtained
before dissolution or after it must be satisfied out of the assets of the
corporations, and that hence such actions are more strongly anala-
gous to suits against executors on causes of action arising ex con-
tractu and should survive the death of the corporation.
A review of the history of this common law maxim sustains the
conclusions of the Court on this point. Its origin can be traced to that
period of English common law when all causes of action were punish-
able offenses and no distinction existed between crimes, torts and
breaches of contract, save the manner and severity of their punish-
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ment. Pollock and Maitland, History of English Law. At that
time the theory of the law was not to repair the damage sustained by
the injured party but to make the offender suffer for his wrong doing.
It is true that fines were sometimes imposed, but upon default in the
payment the offender was answerable in his person.
That this maxim was applicable to such a system of remedial laws
is obvious.
But in the development of the common law, the idea was con-
ceived to make reparation for.private wrongs by awarding damages
to the injured party. The division of causes of action into the great
classes of crimes, torts and actions ex contractu followed. Breaches
of contract obligations were compensated by money damages, the
injured party looking not to the person but to the property of the
party in default, and, as a consequence, actions arising from these
breaches were held to survive the death of the party liable therefor.
Thus, the reason for the maxim gradually disappeared and the maxim
itself became inapplicable to actions ex contractu. Pollock and Mait-
land, supra
Torts, however, retained their quasi-criminal nature for a long
time and it therefore became a fixed rule of the common law that
such actions died with the wrong doer. Hubert's Case, 3 Coke Rep.
II.
But as the theory of money compensation for all wrongs to indi-
viduals has become more and more firmly established in our system
of jurisprudence, the law making bodies have from time to time
enacted statutes which authorize the continuance of certain actions
of torts against the executors and administrators of the wrong doer,
until at the present day the common law maxim has become entirely
inoperative except as to civil actions for libel and slander and a few
other like actions, which are still considered primitive in their nature.
The question may well be raised, whether there is any good reason
for excepting these actions, since the main purpose of suits brought
to enforce them is to recover satisfaction of the property of the
offender.
However that may be with regard to individuals, there surely can
be no reason for the application of this maxim to an artificial body,
which cannot be subjected to punishment and against which but one
remedy exists in favor of individuals regardless of how their cause of
action arises, namely, an action to recover a judgment for damages
to be satisfied out of the assets of the corporation.
